Thursday Gary learned that the Tarrant County Central Labor Council, made up of all local AFL-CIO unions, has endorsed him for District 3 City Council. You heard it here first.
This is wonderful news since Gary is truly a man of the people who has served this City and his neighborhood for the last 10 years. Gary is the only candidate in this race whose record shows that he is interested only in serving his constituents. He has no aspirations to higher office and no fat bank account running over with donations from special corporate interests. He is running against two financial heavy hitters, both of whom are outspending Gary by at least 8 to 1, and one of whom has been the beneficiary of a fundraiser hosted by Rosie Moncrief. This same candidate has been seen at a candidate forum sitting with Danny Scarth, Carter Burdette, and Jungus Jordan.
The present mayor and his Council have not served the people well. They have bestowed lavish tax gifts on Cabela's and other companies that have not produced the tax benefits that were promised to offset the tax abatements. They have botched the handling of the gas industry, placing every neighborhood in the city in danger of an explosion or fire due to heavy industrial installations placed in residential areas by threat or exercise of eminent domain. The negative economic consequences of such an unwise policy will become manifest when it is generally realized that Fort Worth homes may have high pressure raw gas pipelines passing within a few feet of their foundations and when the insurance industry decides this risk will require much higher insurance rates. During this Council's tenure someone has frightened the city staff into requiring a Freedom of Information Act application approval before the most basic public information will be provided to inquiring taxpayers. The mayor has turned city council meetings into gatherings where unwanted information is ignored and freedom of speech is abridged to the point where the truth can only be spoken in the blandest of terms.
Chuck Silcox fought these kinds of unwise proposals. We need Gary Hogan to continue that fight. Otherwise it will be open season on the pocketbooks of District 3 residents.
Saturday, April 11, 2009
Hear no evil, see no evil, speak no evil
In August 2008 Al Armendariz, Ph. D., a researcher and professor at SMU, released a report titled "Emissions from Natural Gas Production in the Barnett Shale Area and Opportunities for Cost-Effective Improvements". He summarized that report for the joint meeting of the City Council and the Gas Drilling Task Force in August. Horror of horrors, his study estimated that the largest contributors to the air toxic emissions from gas production activity were the condensate tanks, followed by the engine exhausts. The September 30, 2008 draft of this report said. "The engines, tanks, and fugitive and intermittent sources combined are expected to emit approximately 620 tons per day total of smog-forming compounds, substantially greater than the emissions from other sources in Dallas-Fort Worth area, such as the major airports or on-road motor vehicles."
This information was received by the City Council silently. Before long Dr. Ed Ireland of the Barnett Shale Energy Education Council was questioning the report, though on what basis it wasn't clear, since Ireland is an economist, not an environmental scientist. The Council remained silent, not even sending out a list of questions to Dr. Armendariz or asking him to return for more intimate discussions. They simply ignored the report in public.
I didn't follow the tit-for-tat on this from September to sometime in March when Danny Scarth, whose scientific credentials are obscure, announced that an EPA report disagreed with the Armendariz report. It said that the quality of air in the DFW area improved steadily over 2008. The announcement must have been by way of justification for the Council's silence on the Armendariz report and their continuation of business as usual regarding the gas industry.
Now we have some answers in today's [4/09/2009] Startlegram as to why these two reports may not be contradictory after all. We learned today that four of TXI's cement plants were idled in 2008. We know that these plants are responsible for much of the air pollution in the DFW area. I don't have any numbers to relate, but it's clearly feasible that these plant closings are responsible for the improved air quality.
What is clear is that the Fort Worth City Council is like the three wise monkeys, "Hear no evil." "See no evil." and "Speak no evil." A public hearing is not a hearing at all. The Council does not hear anything that creates a problem for their plans.
This information was received by the City Council silently. Before long Dr. Ed Ireland of the Barnett Shale Energy Education Council was questioning the report, though on what basis it wasn't clear, since Ireland is an economist, not an environmental scientist. The Council remained silent, not even sending out a list of questions to Dr. Armendariz or asking him to return for more intimate discussions. They simply ignored the report in public.
I didn't follow the tit-for-tat on this from September to sometime in March when Danny Scarth, whose scientific credentials are obscure, announced that an EPA report disagreed with the Armendariz report. It said that the quality of air in the DFW area improved steadily over 2008. The announcement must have been by way of justification for the Council's silence on the Armendariz report and their continuation of business as usual regarding the gas industry.
Now we have some answers in today's [4/09/2009] Startlegram as to why these two reports may not be contradictory after all. We learned today that four of TXI's cement plants were idled in 2008. We know that these plants are responsible for much of the air pollution in the DFW area. I don't have any numbers to relate, but it's clearly feasible that these plant closings are responsible for the improved air quality.
What is clear is that the Fort Worth City Council is like the three wise monkeys, "Hear no evil." "See no evil." and "Speak no evil." A public hearing is not a hearing at all. The Council does not hear anything that creates a problem for their plans.
Another night of kabuki theater--City Council, April 7, 2009
It was another night of kabuki theater, of course. But it was important kabuki theater. If none of us attend they can say whatever they want about what they approved.
Moncrief was in fine fettle and looking robust. The first hour and a half was spent conducting ceremonies to laud various people for their fine contributions to our wonderful city. A new police chief was officially sworn in (again) and Moncrief presented him with two surprises. His parents had been flown in (at our expense, no doubt) to witness this second swearing in. Each council person delivered an obsequious speech about how fortunate we are to have this new chief. Then Moncrief made a big deal about a new policy instituted for this new chief, not only because of his incredible record, but also because we are the 17th largest city in the US now, and big cities have their police chiefs wear four stars on their collars instead of the three we had previously prescribed.
Meanwhile people who had serious business to bring before the council had to wait, but they performed the important duty of scripted adulation at the appropriate points in the script.
Finally the council got down to business. There were three gas drilling related items on the agenda. They all had to do with a package deal CHK had to offer the city in exchange for abandoning their pipeline to nowhere through the residential area south of TCU where the dead-on-arrival drill site by the TCU football stadium is located. Of course, Kevin Strawser, the PR front man for CHK who delivered the presentation, never mentioned that feature of the deal--probably because so many of us had seen through that ploy. Carter Burdette was strangely silent for a change. Of course, as usual CHK was given unlimited time to pitch their case to the monolithic 9 on the dais and the rest of us. Then the people were allowed their usual three minutes to speak.
There were a number of Hispanic homeowners whose homes were within 600 ft of the multiple well pad sites. Their stories, pieced together, painted a picture of typical deception and coercion by the industry landmen who obtained the waivers necessary to put in these 30 odd wells within 600 ft of their homes. Time was, not so long ago, when it was necessary for the drillers to get 100% waivers to even come before the council with an application. Time was when such applications were called "high impact" applications. No more! CHK boasted 90-odd percent waivers in one case and 79% in another, for applications that are now called something else other than High Impact use. I don't recall what the new term is.
I spoke about the arbitrariness of the 600 ft setback rule and how it had nothing to do with public safety. I told them (once again) that the data show that 600 ft is insufficient to define the kill radius of an explosion of a 16 inch gathering line.
A new witness spoke about a significant incident at a CHK site on Henderson recently in which there was a fracking accident that caused a pool of fracking fluid to spread over the entire width of the drilling pad. He showed a photo of it. You could see what appeared to be a white foam on top of the liquid at the center of the spill (if "spill" is an accurate description of what happened). The man said that this foam was a chemical mix placed there by workers who were trying to clean up. Apparently the incident attracted the attention of nearby residents who the man said were frightened. He mentioned that there were children who were frightened. None of us had heard of this incident and were wanting to hear more. But those on the dais sat silent and stone-faced and made no response. The man said it was time to stop the drilling and ask some serious questions. Ho Hum! Stone-faced silence. Moncrief warned this man about his reference to CHK during his three minutes and said he'd better not disobey the speaking rules. Finally, we were treated to the obligatory unlimited council member Wesson Oil party speeches about how in all these hearings there are winners and losers and it is the difficult job of the council to make decisions. Carter Burdette was mercifully silent for a change. All bit players in the script were thanked for their concern and sacrifice of time for civic duties, and they assured all of us that we had been heard.
Joel Burns, who had orchestrated this deal, spoke of how he had been concerned about the lack of a master plan for District 9 (and, oh, by-the-way, a "small part of District 3", which has had no representation since Chuck Silcox passed away). So he was pleased that CHK had developed this "master plan" and he praised it and their civic mindedness and pronounced it good. There were other obsequious speeches to fit the standard requirement for this act of the kabuki theater form. The vote was unanimous.
Note how perception management is used here. "High Impact" is gone. The need for 100% waivers is gone. The need for 600 ft setback is gone, and now we have a "master plan". They have stolen our idea for a master plan, twisted it beyond recognition, and fed it back to us with a straight face. Kabuki theater has replaced the democratic process, relegated public safety to the dust bin, and glorified the looters.
Moncrief was in fine fettle and looking robust. The first hour and a half was spent conducting ceremonies to laud various people for their fine contributions to our wonderful city. A new police chief was officially sworn in (again) and Moncrief presented him with two surprises. His parents had been flown in (at our expense, no doubt) to witness this second swearing in. Each council person delivered an obsequious speech about how fortunate we are to have this new chief. Then Moncrief made a big deal about a new policy instituted for this new chief, not only because of his incredible record, but also because we are the 17th largest city in the US now, and big cities have their police chiefs wear four stars on their collars instead of the three we had previously prescribed.
Meanwhile people who had serious business to bring before the council had to wait, but they performed the important duty of scripted adulation at the appropriate points in the script.
Finally the council got down to business. There were three gas drilling related items on the agenda. They all had to do with a package deal CHK had to offer the city in exchange for abandoning their pipeline to nowhere through the residential area south of TCU where the dead-on-arrival drill site by the TCU football stadium is located. Of course, Kevin Strawser, the PR front man for CHK who delivered the presentation, never mentioned that feature of the deal--probably because so many of us had seen through that ploy. Carter Burdette was strangely silent for a change. Of course, as usual CHK was given unlimited time to pitch their case to the monolithic 9 on the dais and the rest of us. Then the people were allowed their usual three minutes to speak.
There were a number of Hispanic homeowners whose homes were within 600 ft of the multiple well pad sites. Their stories, pieced together, painted a picture of typical deception and coercion by the industry landmen who obtained the waivers necessary to put in these 30 odd wells within 600 ft of their homes. Time was, not so long ago, when it was necessary for the drillers to get 100% waivers to even come before the council with an application. Time was when such applications were called "high impact" applications. No more! CHK boasted 90-odd percent waivers in one case and 79% in another, for applications that are now called something else other than High Impact use. I don't recall what the new term is.
I spoke about the arbitrariness of the 600 ft setback rule and how it had nothing to do with public safety. I told them (once again) that the data show that 600 ft is insufficient to define the kill radius of an explosion of a 16 inch gathering line.
A new witness spoke about a significant incident at a CHK site on Henderson recently in which there was a fracking accident that caused a pool of fracking fluid to spread over the entire width of the drilling pad. He showed a photo of it. You could see what appeared to be a white foam on top of the liquid at the center of the spill (if "spill" is an accurate description of what happened). The man said that this foam was a chemical mix placed there by workers who were trying to clean up. Apparently the incident attracted the attention of nearby residents who the man said were frightened. He mentioned that there were children who were frightened. None of us had heard of this incident and were wanting to hear more. But those on the dais sat silent and stone-faced and made no response. The man said it was time to stop the drilling and ask some serious questions. Ho Hum! Stone-faced silence. Moncrief warned this man about his reference to CHK during his three minutes and said he'd better not disobey the speaking rules. Finally, we were treated to the obligatory unlimited council member Wesson Oil party speeches about how in all these hearings there are winners and losers and it is the difficult job of the council to make decisions. Carter Burdette was mercifully silent for a change. All bit players in the script were thanked for their concern and sacrifice of time for civic duties, and they assured all of us that we had been heard.
Joel Burns, who had orchestrated this deal, spoke of how he had been concerned about the lack of a master plan for District 9 (and, oh, by-the-way, a "small part of District 3", which has had no representation since Chuck Silcox passed away). So he was pleased that CHK had developed this "master plan" and he praised it and their civic mindedness and pronounced it good. There were other obsequious speeches to fit the standard requirement for this act of the kabuki theater form. The vote was unanimous.
Note how perception management is used here. "High Impact" is gone. The need for 100% waivers is gone. The need for 600 ft setback is gone, and now we have a "master plan". They have stolen our idea for a master plan, twisted it beyond recognition, and fed it back to us with a straight face. Kabuki theater has replaced the democratic process, relegated public safety to the dust bin, and glorified the looters.
Tuesday, April 7, 2009
Citizens ask tough questions at forum
Monday evening at a District 3 candidate forum at United Methodist Church, 5000 Southwest Blvd, a man asked the question, "Who among you has had a fundraiser hosted by the Moncriefs?" The only one to answer that he had was Eric Fox.
Another man, after some derogatory remarks about the present mayor, asked, "Has Mike Moncrief endorsed any one of you?" The answer was no.
It was rather clear that this audience, from the Ridglea Hills neighborhood Association, was very much looking for a candidate who would try to carry on in Chuck Silcox's shoes. Of course, every one of them tried mightily to convince them that they were definitely the next Chuck.
Somehow, I don't think anyone but Gary Hogan came close to being a convincing speaker on that subject. The master of ceremonies, Sherryl Cornelius, said that in reality, nobody, in her view, could fill those shoes.
Another man, after some derogatory remarks about the present mayor, asked, "Has Mike Moncrief endorsed any one of you?" The answer was no.
It was rather clear that this audience, from the Ridglea Hills neighborhood Association, was very much looking for a candidate who would try to carry on in Chuck Silcox's shoes. Of course, every one of them tried mightily to convince them that they were definitely the next Chuck.
Somehow, I don't think anyone but Gary Hogan came close to being a convincing speaker on that subject. The master of ceremonies, Sherryl Cornelius, said that in reality, nobody, in her view, could fill those shoes.
Sunday, April 5, 2009
Plane crashes and pipeline disasters
Take a look at the data on the website, http://www.planecrashinfo.com/cause.htm . I’m sure none of you will question whether the data is essentially accurate or meaningful. It all makes sense. Oh, there could be some human error in compiling the data, and maybe some of the columns of percentages don’t add up to exactly 100%. But there is an obvious reason why that happens…round-off error. And most of you don’t feel that this negates the entire presentation, I’m sure.
As you look over the data you see how it can be sliced and diced in different ways to focus on certain questions. And there are certain questions that are not addressed, and no explanation is deemed necessary for the omissions. For example, there is no attempt to answer the question, “How many crashes happened on Mars?” That, of course, would be a nonsensical question, wouldn’t it? Because all plane crashes happen on Earth, since that is where air travel occurs.
The statistics of plane crashes are interesting. We can find out what percentage of all crashes occurred in what phase of flight, for example. Of course, we could parse that statistic and argue that all crashes occur upon landing, but when we do that we have no trouble realizing that what the statistic refers to is the phase of flight during which the critical fatal failure occurred that resulted in the crash. And we don’t dismiss all the data because of that analytical exercise, do we?
The percentage of crashes that occurred among commercial airliner flights as opposed to general aviation (private planes) is also a very interesting way to dice the data. The point is that there is no uniformly “correct” way to dice the data. It is diced to answer particular questions.
One particular aspect of plane crash statistics that is very significant is that every person who died in these crashes made a conscious decision to take the calculable risk of a crash when they boarded the fatal flight unless they were a prisoner or a minor whose parent made that decision. Another important aspect of the risk is that it is a risk that exists only for a finite period, not one that is ever-present day after day.
It is easy to understand how the number of plane crashes in a given period of time is related to the number of flight hours logged for that period.
Now let’s consider the risk of pipeline disasters.
Pipeline Disaster Statistics
One of the first things to notice about pipeline disaster statistics is that very few people have any ideas about them at all. Until the industry had been here in Fort Worth long enough for people to understand that there were serious risks to urban gas production as well as money to be made from it, no one, not even the city fathers, gave it a thought.
The statistics are not easy for the man on the street to find either. They are compiled by an agency, the Texas Railroad Commission, that boasts that it is in business to facilitate the oil and gas business. Certainly, they wouldn’t want to publicize the risks associated with oil and gas production if they could avoid it. But they are required to compile these statistics for the federal government.
The federal agency in charge is the U. S. Department of Transportation Pipeline Hazardous Materials and Safety Administration (PHMSA). Although the word, “safety” is prominent in the name of this agency, their actual operations indicate that safety does not come first in their mission. What comes first is a five foot shelf of law and regulations that is designed to create an illusion of a “safety first” mentality, while in reality being as non-intrusive and permissive as industry can entice the agency to be.
It is not in industry’s interest to publish statistical data that quantifies the number of disasters per mile of pipeline per year. Such a statistic might impede development of the industry. Consequently, the data are buried in reams of spreadsheets that PHMSA publishes with very little information provided on how to use the data in analyses.
As a result, no one had defined a meaningful way to slice and dice the available raw data by the time I began to consider the problem. My career as a scientist and engineer was spent doing just this sort of data analysis and the mathematical modeling necessary to assess the meaning of such data. At this time, even though I have completed the analysis and modeling—which was a very routine exercise—and have published it through the Pipeline Safety Trust, there is local resistance to the acceptance of my paper reporting the results. The resistance is encouraged and financed by the gas drilling and production industry, of course, as one should expect. Nevertheless, I am committed to getting the word out to all who will listen.
The similarities between plane crash data and pipeline disaster data are instructive. First, thanks to PHMSA, a tremendous database exists, just as the plane crash database is extensive. Second, we can slice and dice the data to answer specific questions, just as can be done with plane crash data. Third, there is an intuitive analogy between the number of crashes per flight hour and the number of pipeline disasters per mile of pipeline. The more hours of flight the more crashes, and the more miles of pipeline the more disasters per unit time.
However, there are some differences—equally instructive. First, while it is nonsensical to dice the plane crash data by geographical area, it is very important to do so with pipeline disaster data. Pipeline disasters occur more frequently in heavily populated areas than in unpopulated areas, and when many miles of pipeline are confined to an urban area it is certain that there will be more disasters in such an area than in an equal number of miles of pipeline in the Alaskan wilderness, for example. Thus, it is no stretch of imagination to expect that when there are 300 miles of gas gathering pipeline running through urban Fort Worth there will be more disasters per mile of pipe per year in Fort Worth than in an equal number of miles of pipe spread out in a rural area.
Another difference between plane crashes and pipeline disasters is that eminent domain is to be used to force siting of pipelines through residential neighborhoods in Fort Worth too close to home foundations for safety—by any calculation. This puts people who live and work near these pipelines at risk of fatality, not by their own choice, as in the case of airliner flights, but by the decisions of others who do not have any risk at all but do have financial incentive to force the risk on others. Plus, these risks are borne daily instead of for a short few hours of flight.
Consequences of accepting the risks
There has been less disagreement about the consequences than there has been about the risks, but it is worth repeating those consequences here anyway.
If we allow the industry to place wells and pipelines according to present ordinances and their interpretation, there will be a pipeline disaster here, on average, every four to six months for the life of the gas field, depending upon the number of miles of gas gathering lines inside the city. That’s a statistical certainty. The time between disasters could be as long as 28 months in one percent of cases, but on average it will happen every four to six months.
What is such a disaster? It is, by definition, a pipeline leak or rupture that causes 1) fire, 2) explosion, 3) at least $50,000 in property damage, 4) mass evacuation, or 5) injury or loss of human life. Pipelines as close to homes as is presently permitted can cause homes with pier and beam foundations to explode. It is typical that pipeline ruptures result in explosions that create large craters and huge fires that burn for hours before the fuel can be cut off.
Such disasters occurring repeatedly in Fort Worth are certain to cause property insurance to increase steeply, as was the case with black mold. Also, the repeated disasters will cause a population decrease as property values sink and the city gains a negative national reputation. In the end, the city will shrink in population and decay. We are looking at a future similar to Detroit, MI or Newark, NJ. This is not an exaggeration, folks.
What you can do
Support Gary Hogan for City Council, District 3, regardless of where you live in Fort Worth. If another yes-man for Mayor Moncrief is elected on May 9 this problem will never be solved.
Vote for Clyde Picht for Mayor. Clyde is against this disastrous gas industry policy.
As you look over the data you see how it can be sliced and diced in different ways to focus on certain questions. And there are certain questions that are not addressed, and no explanation is deemed necessary for the omissions. For example, there is no attempt to answer the question, “How many crashes happened on Mars?” That, of course, would be a nonsensical question, wouldn’t it? Because all plane crashes happen on Earth, since that is where air travel occurs.
The statistics of plane crashes are interesting. We can find out what percentage of all crashes occurred in what phase of flight, for example. Of course, we could parse that statistic and argue that all crashes occur upon landing, but when we do that we have no trouble realizing that what the statistic refers to is the phase of flight during which the critical fatal failure occurred that resulted in the crash. And we don’t dismiss all the data because of that analytical exercise, do we?
The percentage of crashes that occurred among commercial airliner flights as opposed to general aviation (private planes) is also a very interesting way to dice the data. The point is that there is no uniformly “correct” way to dice the data. It is diced to answer particular questions.
One particular aspect of plane crash statistics that is very significant is that every person who died in these crashes made a conscious decision to take the calculable risk of a crash when they boarded the fatal flight unless they were a prisoner or a minor whose parent made that decision. Another important aspect of the risk is that it is a risk that exists only for a finite period, not one that is ever-present day after day.
It is easy to understand how the number of plane crashes in a given period of time is related to the number of flight hours logged for that period.
Now let’s consider the risk of pipeline disasters.
Pipeline Disaster Statistics
One of the first things to notice about pipeline disaster statistics is that very few people have any ideas about them at all. Until the industry had been here in Fort Worth long enough for people to understand that there were serious risks to urban gas production as well as money to be made from it, no one, not even the city fathers, gave it a thought.
The statistics are not easy for the man on the street to find either. They are compiled by an agency, the Texas Railroad Commission, that boasts that it is in business to facilitate the oil and gas business. Certainly, they wouldn’t want to publicize the risks associated with oil and gas production if they could avoid it. But they are required to compile these statistics for the federal government.
The federal agency in charge is the U. S. Department of Transportation Pipeline Hazardous Materials and Safety Administration (PHMSA). Although the word, “safety” is prominent in the name of this agency, their actual operations indicate that safety does not come first in their mission. What comes first is a five foot shelf of law and regulations that is designed to create an illusion of a “safety first” mentality, while in reality being as non-intrusive and permissive as industry can entice the agency to be.
It is not in industry’s interest to publish statistical data that quantifies the number of disasters per mile of pipeline per year. Such a statistic might impede development of the industry. Consequently, the data are buried in reams of spreadsheets that PHMSA publishes with very little information provided on how to use the data in analyses.
As a result, no one had defined a meaningful way to slice and dice the available raw data by the time I began to consider the problem. My career as a scientist and engineer was spent doing just this sort of data analysis and the mathematical modeling necessary to assess the meaning of such data. At this time, even though I have completed the analysis and modeling—which was a very routine exercise—and have published it through the Pipeline Safety Trust, there is local resistance to the acceptance of my paper reporting the results. The resistance is encouraged and financed by the gas drilling and production industry, of course, as one should expect. Nevertheless, I am committed to getting the word out to all who will listen.
The similarities between plane crash data and pipeline disaster data are instructive. First, thanks to PHMSA, a tremendous database exists, just as the plane crash database is extensive. Second, we can slice and dice the data to answer specific questions, just as can be done with plane crash data. Third, there is an intuitive analogy between the number of crashes per flight hour and the number of pipeline disasters per mile of pipeline. The more hours of flight the more crashes, and the more miles of pipeline the more disasters per unit time.
However, there are some differences—equally instructive. First, while it is nonsensical to dice the plane crash data by geographical area, it is very important to do so with pipeline disaster data. Pipeline disasters occur more frequently in heavily populated areas than in unpopulated areas, and when many miles of pipeline are confined to an urban area it is certain that there will be more disasters in such an area than in an equal number of miles of pipeline in the Alaskan wilderness, for example. Thus, it is no stretch of imagination to expect that when there are 300 miles of gas gathering pipeline running through urban Fort Worth there will be more disasters per mile of pipe per year in Fort Worth than in an equal number of miles of pipe spread out in a rural area.
Another difference between plane crashes and pipeline disasters is that eminent domain is to be used to force siting of pipelines through residential neighborhoods in Fort Worth too close to home foundations for safety—by any calculation. This puts people who live and work near these pipelines at risk of fatality, not by their own choice, as in the case of airliner flights, but by the decisions of others who do not have any risk at all but do have financial incentive to force the risk on others. Plus, these risks are borne daily instead of for a short few hours of flight.
Consequences of accepting the risks
There has been less disagreement about the consequences than there has been about the risks, but it is worth repeating those consequences here anyway.
If we allow the industry to place wells and pipelines according to present ordinances and their interpretation, there will be a pipeline disaster here, on average, every four to six months for the life of the gas field, depending upon the number of miles of gas gathering lines inside the city. That’s a statistical certainty. The time between disasters could be as long as 28 months in one percent of cases, but on average it will happen every four to six months.
What is such a disaster? It is, by definition, a pipeline leak or rupture that causes 1) fire, 2) explosion, 3) at least $50,000 in property damage, 4) mass evacuation, or 5) injury or loss of human life. Pipelines as close to homes as is presently permitted can cause homes with pier and beam foundations to explode. It is typical that pipeline ruptures result in explosions that create large craters and huge fires that burn for hours before the fuel can be cut off.
Such disasters occurring repeatedly in Fort Worth are certain to cause property insurance to increase steeply, as was the case with black mold. Also, the repeated disasters will cause a population decrease as property values sink and the city gains a negative national reputation. In the end, the city will shrink in population and decay. We are looking at a future similar to Detroit, MI or Newark, NJ. This is not an exaggeration, folks.
What you can do
Support Gary Hogan for City Council, District 3, regardless of where you live in Fort Worth. If another yes-man for Mayor Moncrief is elected on May 9 this problem will never be solved.
Vote for Clyde Picht for Mayor. Clyde is against this disastrous gas industry policy.
Coming soon...to your neighborhood
This picture was taken about 1:30 PM on 4-09-09 from Old Weatherford Hwy near Chapel Creek subdivision west of Loop 820. This is a typical Chesapeake drilling pad. The truck is collecting condensate from the tanks in the background. On the right is the lift compressor for this pad. It is powered by raw gas produced by the wells. The tan vertical wall is an acoustic blanket that is supposed to decrease the sound level coming from the compressor. The dark object showing above the acoustic blanket is the exhaust muffler for the compressor. The sound level was loudest at the low frequencies--you know, the ones that vibrate your body when a kid drives by in a car with a loud booming sound system going full blast. The idea that such a compressor will be needed on every drilling pad in Fort Worth and that many will be within 600 ft of homes is alarming.
The truck comes daily. The hose is about 6 inches in diameter and removes liquid from the bottom of the big tanks. It is an accordion-style hose. You can see it snaking over the spill barrier in front of the tanks and bending upward to the level of the truck's tank. There must be a pump somewhere to pump the liquid up into the truck.
Can you imagine this sort of thing happening daily at your neighborhood drill pad? Did they tell you about all this when they asked you to sign that lease?
Why are these people at these forums?
There was a District 3 candidate forum at my neighborhood elementary school a couple of weeks ago--the school that Chesapeake thought was OK to put at risk so that my neighbors would not be deprived of their rights to mineral profits. It was on a Tuesday night and was locally advertised by email to the two neighborhood associations involved.
There were quite a number of people in attendance, and all seven candidates showed up to speak. At the end of the evening's speeches I noticed Kevin Strawser, the latest Chesapeake spokesman, leaving his seat in the middle of the auditorium. He departed the building without speaking to any of the candidates or anyone else in the room.
A few nights later, at a District 3 forum at Lost Creek Golf Club, another industry representative, Walter Duuease of XTO, did the same duty. He came quietly, said not a word during Q&A, and left after the speeches.
Why do you think CHK and XTO are so interested in the District 3 City Council race?
I don't happen to know what Brian Eppstein looks like, but I wouldn't be surprised if he also attended these forums. On the other hand, maybe he just sends one of his people instead.
There were quite a number of people in attendance, and all seven candidates showed up to speak. At the end of the evening's speeches I noticed Kevin Strawser, the latest Chesapeake spokesman, leaving his seat in the middle of the auditorium. He departed the building without speaking to any of the candidates or anyone else in the room.
A few nights later, at a District 3 forum at Lost Creek Golf Club, another industry representative, Walter Duuease of XTO, did the same duty. He came quietly, said not a word during Q&A, and left after the speeches.
Why do you think CHK and XTO are so interested in the District 3 City Council race?
I don't happen to know what Brian Eppstein looks like, but I wouldn't be surprised if he also attended these forums. On the other hand, maybe he just sends one of his people instead.
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